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Macroprudential Ideas and Contested Social Purpose: A 
response to Terrence Casey 
Andrew Baker and Wesley Widmaier 
In his Policy Matters piece in this issue of BJPIR, Terrence Casey (Casey 2015) has 
performed two services to the political science community trying to make sense of the 
political economy emerging from the financial crash of 2008. First, he has made a forceful 
interpretation of what macroprudential regulation as a whole new post-crash policy field 
(Baker, 2013, Borio, 2011, Haldane, 2013), actually amounts to. Few have been so bold. 
Casey is clear, macroprudential will evolve as a set of technologies and instruments to fix the 
primary weakness (financial instability) in what he calls neoliberalism, but what might more 
accurately be referred to as Anglo-Liberal financialized capitalism (ALFC)1. Others writing 
about this new emerging policy field (and there will be many), will undoubtedly have to take 
this contentious and forceful argument seriously and respond and even position themselves in 
relation to the empirical accuracy of Casey’s interpretation. Second, Casey has drawn 
attention to what is undoubtedly the most important question facing macroprudential 
regulation that has so far been overlooked in technical policy debates and in the emerging 
social science literature on macroprudential, - the question of social purpose. Although Casey 
never uses the term, he is effectively making an argument about the purpose for which state 
power (and intervention) will and should be employed in the economy and the resulting 
normative frameworks of macroprudential governance (Ruggie, 1982, p.384). This is one of 
the big, central questions of our age. It speaks broadly to the theme of whether post-crash 
reform efforts should be aiming to bring about a significant transformation in the Anglo 
Liberal model of political economy, in terms of the institutional relationships, market forms 
and the state-society bargains on which it rests, or whether these efforts should be directed 
towards preserving the existing system. In this sense, Casey is making an argument not only 
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about the desirable normative purpose of macroprudential as the saviour of ALFC, but also 
the normative content and stance of its constituent ideas and concepts concerning the 
desirability and optimality of financialized capitalism of the 21st Century. By doing this 
Casey is reminding us that the macroprudential regulatory project will not be normatively 
neutral and is therefore highlighting just how much is at stake in this emerging field of public 
policy.  
        However, in this response we want to highlight five inconsistencies or short comings in 
Casey’s argument and analysis that should cause us to question its overall veracity. The first 
problem is that Casey sets up two hypotheses that he presents as oppositional, or mutually 
exclusive, but which are just as likely to be compatible and complementary. What Casey 
terms the debt driven growth hypothesis (DDG) and the financial instability hypothesis (FIH) 
are presented as rival explanations for the financial crash of 2008 that academics and policy 
makers have to choose between. This rather stark and artificial separation is made to do the 
majority of the work in Casey’s argument, because Casey essentially sides with FIH, against 
DDG, which is seen to be less hostile and even neutral towards ‘neoliberalism’ because it 
applies to all economies with relatively liberalised financial systems. DDG on the other hand 
provides a focused critique of ALFC and its limited capacity to generate growth without a 
resort to dangerously high levels of debt financing that ultimately prove unsustainable. The 
classification of DDG and FIH into separate and oppositional perspectives is however 
inherently problematic. Casey’s argument revolves around the claim that FIH reverses the 
causation of DDG, because under the FIH perspective finance creates instabilities which 
undermine productive growth, whereas under DDG poor productive performance results in a 
turn to debt financing resulting in financial instability (p.7). The causation here is assumed to 
be one way, or linear, – either excessive debt and credit causes poor productive performance 
(FIH), or poor productive performance and restricted growth results in a turn to credit and 
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debt which proves unsustainable (DDG). Such a formulation is simplistically reductive and is 
not reflective of complex adaptive economic and financial systems that often display non-
linear dynamics, which is in turn a fundamental insight of the emerging macroprudential 
perspective (Haldane and Nelson, 2012, Blyth, 2010.)  The notion that DDG and FIH are 
connected and feed into one another is not considered. For example, it is possible to accept 
the proposition that financial markets are procyclical, characterised by herding and inherent 
instability, as per FIH, without necessarily rejecting the claims of DDG that debt has become 
integral to growth in the Anglo Liberal world (private sector debt was over 400% of GDP in 
the UK in 2011, Thompson, 2013). In this respect, the form, course and size of any given 
financial cycle will not be unrelated to the wider structures of a given political economy, but 
will interact with those structures dynamically, yet Casey rather side steps this issue with a 
very static analysis, that simply looks at the correlation between equity withdrawal and 
overall growth in the US and the UK over three decades. The macroprudential perspective 
itself, holds that the financial cycle, financial risk and financial instability are endogenous 
and dynamic features of the economic system as a whole (Persuad, 2009, Borio, 2009). The 
logical extension of this position is that the creation of debt, credit and leverage, and the 
associated outgrowth in shadow banking trading in exotic derivatives and securities products, 
became part of the Anglo Liberal growth model and were not separate from the growth 
dynamics and social settlements, or everyday lived experiences of consumers and citizens 
(Langley, 2010, Seabrooke, 2006, Crouch, 2009), but very much an integral part of them. The 
fact that Casey acknowledges that the crisis of 2008, was a crisis of debt on the final page of 
his analysis, might suggest that Anglo Liberal economies not only have a propensity to 
generate debt (which has been growing in Casey’s own admission), but also that rather than 
being competing explanations, DDG and FIH are in fact intimately intertwined and 
complementary explanations. That debt and credit become central to a growth model, does 
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not invalidate the financial instability hypothesis, but can exacerbate financial instability and 
make FIH more salient. Likewise accepting FIH does not mean we have to reject the notion 
that debt can become integral to a particular growth model. In this sense, we do not have to 
choose between DDG and FIH. We can accept both, or elements of both, and many 
macroprudentialists do, yet it is precisely because Casey portrays DDG and FIG as 
oppositional, that he is able to make the case for FIG at the expense of DDG, and thereby 
suggest that FIH is supportive of and can save neoliberalism. 
         Second in relation to the empirics and the implicit conception of ALFC employed, we 
also have cause to question Casey’s analysis.  Casey’s defence of ALFC (or neoliberalism) 
and his assertion that it is worth saving, is essentially based on two empirical claims that tell 
us a lot about his static conception of this model. The first is that it was only after 2000 that 
equity withdrawal actually boosted consumption. Prior to this, during the 1980s and 1990s, 
productivity and growth rose in the United States and the United Kingdom without a reliance 
on debt financing. The problem with this argument is that it neglects to view ALFC as an 
evolving and complex adaptive system. Anglo Liberal capitalism in other words has 
continued to evolve and change its form. For example, financial innovation and engineering, 
driven by policies of deregulation, evolved throughout the 1990s, increasing the share of 
financial activities, expanding debt levels so that debt and credit became a major engine of 
growth in the 2000s, even in the terms of Casey’s limited empirics. Likewise two decades of 
structural reform and ‘flexible labour market policies’, have resulted in real wage stagnation 
and downward wage pressure for large sections of the population, with financialization and 
credit filling the void. Raghan Rajan’s book Faultlines demonstrates how levels of debt 
among households rose pretty much exactly in line with levels of inequality in the US (Rajan, 
2010). The Anglo Liberal capitalism of the 21st Century has continued to evolve. It is not the 
same system, set of social relations and growth model that existed in the 1980s and 1990s 
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that Casey wishes to defend. Therefore, we have to at least consider the possibility that 
financialized Anglo Liberal capitalism has evolved past a threshold point of pathology, 
generating financial instability and inequality that has begun to erode its own productive 
capacity. Casey’s analysis does not entertain this possibility, but the most extensive historical 
study to date certainly generates substantial data in support of such a scenario (Piketty, 2014).  
          Casey’s second empirical point is that financial cycles and instability are not specific to 
ALFC. All economies with liberalised financial systems suffer from them. In historical terms, 
this is indisputable.  However, as Casey concedes ALFC appears to exacerbate the size of 
financial cycles. Not only was the financial cycle and subsequent crash in 2008 the largest 
ever recorded, imposing huge costs, including over a year’s lost output and severe fiscal 
damage due to socialized losses, leading to questions as to whether sovereigns could ever 
again afford a crash on such a scale (Alessandri and Haldane 2009, Haldane 2012,) but it was 
also clear the crash itself emanated from Anglo-American financial centres and practices. The 
question raised by this is whether these growing costs are worth it, are sustainable, and how 
these will be judged by populations and politicians. On this basis, it is far from clear that 
ALFC is either sustainable, or worth saving. Can the model’s apparent propensity to generate 
financial cycles on a scale never seen before, really be offset by relatively modest growth 
during the 1980s and 1990s that did not appear to depend on debt financing?  
           A third problem with Casey’s analysis relates to how he treats the relationship between 
the financial sector and macroeconomic performance, which is also a central focus of 
macroprudential regulation. Casey invokes a fairly simple correlation between equity 
withdrawal and growth, to argue that Anglo liberal capitalism managed to grow over two 
decades during the 1980s and 1990s. However, he largely overlooks the complex, dynamic 
and evolving nature of the relationship between financial sector activities and 
macroeconomic performance. This is a significant oversight. For example, Andrew Haldane a 
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leading macroprudential advocate at the Bank of England, refers to a ‘vacuum cleaner’ effect 
in which monies and people were drawn into banking. Haldane argues that this process had 
silent costs for other areas of the economy, as resources and personnel were drawn away from 
other sectors starving them of sunlight. Research intensive businesses and those reliant on 
substantial external funds such as infrastructure projects suffered most, as scarce skilled 
labour and funds were sucked into finance (Haldane, 2012, p.4). The Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), which has a claim to being the spiritual and intellectual home of 
macroprudential regulation, has recently published research to suggest that once a Bank goes 
over 100 per cent of GDP it starts to act as a drag on growth (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012). 
Notably, the balance sheets of the UK’s three largest banks were still over 400 per cent of 
GDP in 2012. Even before we consider the subsidy to banking that Haldane puts at several 
hundred billion dollars a year on a global basis (Haldane, 2012), and the problem of too big 
to fail, that results in implicit public bail out guarantees for large banks, it is clear that large 
heavily leveraged banks are not necessarily efficient, but can impose significant costs on the 
wider economy. Haldane has also pointed out how banking became a transactional, sales 
driven business, which was accompanied by and fed into a process of shortening of time 
horizons in capital markets, so that even long term investment is now very short. These trends 
mean that those infrastructure and hi-tech projects that do most to boost growth, but are 
usually long duration projects, suffer most (Haldane and Davies, 2011). Picking up on some 
of these themes, a recent contribution from civil society, has suggested that heavily 
financialized societies such as the US and the UK, suffer from a developed country version of 
the resource curse, - the finance curse (Shaxson and Christensen, 2013).  In other words, 
there is a growing evidence to suggest that once financialization and financial activities go 
beyond a certain size and volume, as an organic outgrowth of ALFC, they start to prove 
detrimental to the wider economy and macroeconomic performance. Such analyses are now 
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preoccupying many working within a macroprudential perspective. Yet Casey’s case in 
defence of ALFC, almost entirely overlooks these issues and debates, even though they are 
emerging as the most powerful critique of unfettered financialization. If we take these views 
seriously it suggests that macroprudential regulation should also deal with issues relating to 
the size and structure of the financial sector, which would potentially involve interventions 
that would in all likelihood gradually changed the growth model of ALFC. Such debates are 
not yet settled, but remain contested.   
      A fourth problem is that the macroprudential perspective is a very uncomfortable 
intellectual bed fellow for neoliberalism as described by Casey. By presenting the FIH 
perspective as the saviour of neoliberalism, Casey is essentially claiming that the ideational 
and normative content of contemporary macroprudential ideas are favourable and 
sympathetic to the core ideas of neoliberalism, but there are substantial grounds for believing 
they are not. As Casey recounts, “neoliberals assume market competition produces varied risk 
assessment. Miscalculation is punished and accuracy rewarded, the market thus endorsing 
winning strategies.” (p.7.) Yet the macroprudential perspective adopts a view of financial 
markets that is antithetical to the one outlined by above. As described by Paul Tucker 
formerly of the Bank of England, a macroprudential perspective involves thinking “of 
markets as inefficient, riddled with preferred habitats, imperfect information, regulatory 
arbitrage, herding and inhabited by agents with less than idealised rationality” (Tucker, 2011, 
pp.3-4). Neoliberalism is more than just a growth model. As Casey indicates it has an 
important ideational component consisting of beliefs about how economies and markets 
function and behave, that in turn becomes constitutive of reality by creating institutional blue 
prints for appropriate and desirable governance arrangements and practices (Blyth, 2002). 
Ideas are prior in the sense that they are constitutive of particular sets of economic and social 
relations by generating institutional blue prints and future policy possibilities (Blyth, 2002). 
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Neoliberalism by this reading is a state-society complex of social practices and relations that 
are at least partly created, rationalised and legitimated by conceptions of markets (ideas) that 
are simultaneously analytically descriptive and explanatory, as well as normative. The claims 
and internal constitution of ideas, how they relate to one another, and the claims they make 
about appropriate forms of state intervention and market practice, are therefore integral to any 
socio economic order.  
         When we think in these terms the most fundamental tension in Casey’s argument is 
revealed: that some decidedly non neoliberal ideas, about the inherent malfunctioning and 
pathologies of financial markets, are required to save neoliberalism. The financialized 
neoliberalism that has become synonymous with the Anglo Liberal world over the last thirty 
years saw simplified versions of Eugene Fama’s efficient markets theory became part of the 
institutional DNA at regulatory agencies such as the UK’s Financial Services Authority 
(Turner, 2011).  These beliefs in the self-equilibriating properties of financial markets and the 
benefits of financial innovation and market completion, were the intellectual rationale for an 
approach to financial governance based on light touch supervision and assessments of private 
sector risk management models (Persaud, 2009, Tsingou, 2008). In contrast, the 
macroprudential perspective, essentially argues that the state (whether through central banks, 
or other agencies) has a duty to minimize the inherent instability of the financial cycle and the 
socially suboptimal outcomes that result, by using prudential measures for macroeconomic 
ends (Haldane, 2014c). On a more practical level, many of the policy instruments that fit 
under the macroprudential umbrella, such as countercyclical capital ratios, time varying 
liquidity buffers, and maximum leverage ratios, all intervene directly and set parameters to 
private institution’s business models. They involve regulators adopting positions and seeking 
to limit and trammel private investment strategies at key moments, - a decidedly non 
neoliberal proposition.  
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          Philosophically the justification for such countercyclical policy interventions is similar 
to the one Keynes made regarding states needing to manage the instabilities of the business 
cycle, socializing the conditions of investment to limit unemployment. Notably, Casey 
partially recognises the tension that arises from this when he notes that the ideas of Hyman 
Minsky - an opponent of the free market, are the potential saviour of the neoliberal growth 
model (p.10). Both Minsky and Keynes had normative views that run contrary to the 
neoliberal premises outlined by Casey. The final chapter of Minsky’s biographical study 
revisits Keynes final chapter in The General Theory on social philosophy, adopting a critical 
and negative view of rentier activities and arguing in favour of interventionist and activist 
policies, including taxation to achieve a more equitable distribution of income (Minsky, 
1975, p.158.) Minsky himself advocated regulating the debt financing of investment for large 
scale organizations to reduce the tendency for capitalism to generate serious financial crises, 
and to combine this with concerted efforts to increase the income of the poor (Minsky, 1975, 
p.165).  
       There also deeper ontological tensions between macroprudential thinking and the rational 
expectations micro foundations of much of the economic theory that has driven neoliberal 
policy prescription. Most notably, macroprudential’s key conceptual foundation is a 
recognition of the need to avoid fallacies of composition (Borio, 2011, p4).  The idea of a 
fallacy of composition holds that individual rational self interested actors seemingly 
following their interests will not necessarily cohere to produce stable and efficient systemic 
outcomes, but will result in systemic risks resulting from collective rather than individual 
behaviours. As Keynes noted, “it is not a correct deduction from the principles of economics 
that enlightened self interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self 
interest generally is enlightened, more often individuals acting separately to promote their 
own ends are too ignorant, or too weak to attain even these” (Keynes, 1931, pp.287-88).  In 
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this sense, a macroprudential approach through its acknowledgement of ‘fallacies of 
compostion’ is invoking a public ethics and based on macro moralities around the need for 
systemic financial regulators, with implications for the social purpose of economic policy 
interventions (Best and Widmaier, 2006). While notions like the public or the common good 
do not disappear completely in microclassical analyses that have provided one of the primary 
intellectual foundations for neoliberalism, they do become merely additive. In contrast, a 
macroprudential perspective, does not see the world as being just made up of atomistic 
individuals, but also includes social entities and forces that possess an autonomous standing, 
as the aggregate is more than just the sum of its individual parts. From a macro perspective 
therefore an individual’s responsibility for his or her wealth is always complicated by broader 
systemic forces (Best and Widmaier, 2006, p.617). Because of this public forms of economic 
action become necessary to stabilize macro-level processes with the state having a moral 
obligation to its citizens to pursue their economic welfare. In this moral and economic 
universe, responsibility for economic success or failure is not borne alone by individuals but 
instead is shared by the social collective, and rests on the legitimacy of a public authority 
pursuing interventions to protect a wider public interest, or social purpose. In this regard, 
ethical overtones cannot be dismissed as ‘merely normative’ preferences, but rather are 
rooted in deeper ontological assumptions. Macro perspectives with their conception of the 
economy as a social whole, seek to pursue policies in order to achieve a social good which 
ultimately exceeds the sum of any individual gains. Microclassical (neoliberal) pessimism 
about public officials in general and public economic interventions in particular is rooted an 
individualist moral vision (neoliberalism) that is not shared by the macroprudential 
perspective. The shift to a macroprudential perspective therefore opens a different range of 
moral and ethical possibilities and articulations of social purpose that markedly differ to those 
evident in neoliberal assumptions about markets.  
10 
 
      The emergence of macroprudential thinking raises the question of what is its social 
purpose? Casey’s argument is that this social purpose should be to patch up and maintain 
what he calls neoliberalism, but as the discussion here has indicated macroprudential ideas 
challenge many of the conceptual and intellectual foundations of neoliberalism. At the very 
least, ideas about markets and accompanying justifications for public policy interventions 
have been modified and heavily revised by the macroprudential turn. If the ideational base of 
neoliberalism is being subverted by opposing premises this raises two questions: whether 
macroprudential regulation is compatible with neoliberalism as a state-society complex and 
whether we can still meaningfully talk of neoliberalism if some of its core ideas are being 
questioned and overturned? 
         If the ideational content of macroprudential is potentially incompatible with 
neoliberalism’s own premises, the final weakness in Casey’s argument is that some of the 
biggest champions of the macroprudential perspective, within the UK, have also indicated 
that they view the move towards macroprudential as part of a deeper transformation. Such 
views have also been highly critical of ALFC in its existing form. In other words, many from 
within the macroprudential perspective contest Casey’s vision of the most suitable social 
purpose for macroprudential. This in turn might suggest that macroprudential is just as likely 
to challenge and change ALFC as it is to protect and reinforce it. In the UK, for example 
Adair Turner’s remarks about socially useless finance echoed the earlier stance against 
rentierism adopted by Keynes and Minsky.  He has also called for policy action to address 
rising inequality alongside countercyclical policies, as a cause of financial instability and to 
address global imbalances (Turner, 2010, p.24). Turner also favours a more expansive and 
ambitious form of macroprudential regulation including measures to tax debt pollution, much 
closer management of the quantity and the mix of categories of credit, including diverting 
credit away from property towards businesses to fund new capital investment by specially 
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public licensed banks whose sole function is to finance such activities, thereby leaning 
against identifiable biases arising from free market dynamics (Turner, 2010, p.30).  Such 
policies would result in a much more interventionist public policy regime, that would seek to 
restructure financial activities and target some of the diagnosed root causes of rising debt, 
reducing the scale of financial transacting therefore potentially modifying ALFC (Turner, 
2011). Andy Haldane has suggested that macroprudential regulation is about making finance 
‘the servant rather than the master’ (Haldane, 2014). Such a notion speaks about re-
structuring some of the power relations at the core of ALFC. Haldane has also talked about 
the need for the greatest and most radical financial reformation for over 80 years, which he 
also believes is underway (Haldane, 2012). In his latest speech, Haldane suggests that the 
shareholder model of ALFC has resulted in ‘unfair shares’ that have undermined productive 
capacity (Haldane, 2014b). In short, many macroprudential pioneers view it as a regulatory 
project that can make a more far reaching contribution to a fundamental restructuring in 
social and economic relations, including as the basis for a reduced reliance on 
financialization, which in turn would surely fundamentally alter the character of ALFC and 
its constituent social and political relations. In other words, the sense of social purpose that 
macroprudential is supposed to serve is far from settled. It is a contested and contingent 
public policy question that will be settled by the interaction of evidence led technical debate 
and the moods, pressures and impulses of the political process. The danger of Casey’s 
analysis is that it risks obscuring that many of the key debates within macroprudential 
regulation are not yet settled and that it has much potential beyond patching up the status quo. 
The task for political economists and political scientists analysing emerging macroprudential 
regimes is to offer up interpretations and prescriptions concerning the social purpose of these 
regimes. Terrence Casey’s analysis has provided a start to that process, albeit a highly 
contentious one. 
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